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I. Introduction 
 
Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) is the United States’ most significant, if not its only 
attempted, experiment with universal asset policies. The PFD’s political successes are well-documented1 
as are its financial returns; residents have received $1400 per year on average over the last decade from 
state oil revenues.2 Other contributors to this volume, particularly those in Part III, query whether the 
“Alaska Model” is fit for export and adaptation in other U.S. jurisdictions and countries. But before 
approaching that question, theorists and policymakers must be precise about the reasons for implementing 
a natural resource-based dividend. That is, we must clarify where potential program outcomes fit in the 
larger portfolio of economic rights and obligations guaranteed by the state. In the case of the PFD, 
applying the right label among the standard list of liberal economic programs remains an important and 
unfinished task, one that should help other institutions apply its principles better and understand its 
promise and limitations. Is the PFD a realization of “real-freedom-for-all” basic income? Might it have 
foreshadowed the Stakeholder Society decades before the proposal emerged in public discourse? Or does 
it belong in some entirely separate category, perhaps a hybrid of the first two?  
Categorizing the PDF has proved elusive because these two dominant paradigms for liberal 
economic policy share much in common yet remain separated by differences in underlying motivation. 
Whether basic income or stakeholding theory, particularly each idea’s assumptions about which economic 
commitments maximize individual freedom, best fits the PFD model should matter as much as its mere 
operational design. For, the guaranteed income mechanism chosen may be ill-equipped to satisfy the 
government’s articulated political economy goals. Unsurprisingly, adherents to the basic income and 
stakeholding camps have understood the PFD to embody their preferred vision of a resuscitated, twenty-
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first century political liberalism. Philippe Van Parijs has claimed, “the only political unit that has ever 
introduced a genuine basic income . . . is the state of Alaska.”3 Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, 
architects of the Stakeholder Society, likewise interpreted the Alaska Model through the lens of 
stakeholding.4 Neither claim is entirely correct or entirely mistaken.  
This chapter examines how the Permanent Fund Dividend, although facially more aligned with a 
basic income design, nevertheless reflects some of the values championed by stakeholding proponents. 
The PFD still could be repurposed for experimentation with stakeholding principles, albeit at the sub-
national level. Section II briefly distinguishes basic income from stakeholding as mechanisms for 
promoting individual freedom through a bundle of economic birthrights. I also discuss how core features 
of the PFD demonstrate Alaska’s implicit belief in stakeholding but currently fall short of the sweeping 
citizenship agenda identified by stakeholding theorists. Like a true stakeholder initiative, the PFD 
distributes shared resources on a means-independent basis, does not require recipients to work or 
otherwise participate in the economy, and commits the government to monetary distributions rather than 
in-kind transfers. Nevertheless, the PFD does not—and in its current format cannot—enable Alaskans to 
pursue their individual life plans independently of other income sources. The small dividend payments 
alone are simply insufficient. The program also does not require beneficiaries to pay back into the system 
and ensure its long-term solvency, an element of reciprocity that stakeholding theory deems fundamental. 
Section III moves beyond definitions and addresses the PFD’s special characteristic, its funding through 
existing resources rather than the public coffers. This feature, what I call the “endogeneity condition,” in a 
sense extracts the PFD from the basic income versus stakeholding debate. My point is not the same as the 
familiar argument demonstrating how a stakeholding endowment, or “stock,” is comparable to a periodic 
payment, or “flow,” under a basic income system. Rather, I focus on how the PFD’s internal funding 
allows us to abstract away from the particulars of financing basic income or stakeholding and analyze the 
                                                           
3
 Van Parijs, 2004, p. 9; see also Van Parijs, 1995.  
4
 Ackerman et al., 1999, p. 13 (“[T]he citizens of Alaska have made stakeholding a regular part of their political 
economy. . . . Rather than using [oil revenues] for public expenditures, the Republican leadership designed a 
stakeholding scheme that is now distributing about one thousand dollars a year to every Alaskan citizen.”). 
3 
 
consumption side of the system. Section IV then considers how the State of Alaska might reorient the 
PFD toward a more comprehensive stakeholding structure. I conclude by calling for more research into 
the use of resource-based asset systems to begin understanding local patterns in dividend consumption 
behavior so that governments can more aptly choose among basic income, stakeholding, and other 
funding schemes.  
II. The Permanent Dividend Fund and the Elements of a Stakeholder Society 
 
A. Overview 
  
The original proposal for realizing a Stakeholder Society in the United States appeared in Bruce 
Ackerman and Anne Alstott’s 1999 book of the same name. Rejecting previous arguments for laissez-
faire civic freedom espoused by libertarians and the cost-benefit approach of utilitarians, they advanced a 
universal notion of economic independence. Each American citizen in a stakeholding regime who resides 
in the country for at least eleven years would receive $80,000 upon reaching age twenty-one. The lump 
sum would accrue over four years in equal installments, and an individual could elect to receive the funds 
at age eighteen if used to finance higher education. No other eligibility criteria would accompany the 
payment except for the requirements that the recipient earn a high school diploma and maintain a clean 
criminal record. 
Setting aside the obvious differences in required capital to fund such an ambitious plan rather 
than a more modest basic income design, which I discuss later, the Stakeholder Society envisions 
repayment of the original $80,000 plus interest at the end of one’s life. For the earliest cohorts receiving 
stakeholding funds, a wealth tax of 2% would be levied on the most affluent households. Over time, 
stakeholding beneficiaries assume intergenerational obligations. Avoiding the same wealth transfers 
within families that have generated enormous economic disparities, Ackerman and Alstott would allow 
stakeholders to hold their $80,000 “in trust”;5 a stakeholder would be allowed to use her resources with 
complete freedom and control during her lifetime. She must, however, repay her stake with interest before 
bequeathing to her heirs.  
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Recasting stakeholders as trustees, who receive a considerable share of the political community’s 
resources but ensure that a comparable share exists for the next generation and beyond, stands out as the 
hallmark of the original Stakeholder Society proposal. Relative to basic income proposals, stakeholding 
contemplates a liberal political order in which overlapping generations invest in future cohorts’ prosperity 
rather than just their own. A repayment mandate not only ensures the long-term solvency of the 
stakeholding system, it also reinforces the shared commitments that bind members of a political 
community without consideration to when they enter that community.  
Basic income systems are the most frequently cited alternatives to the stakeholder ideal. 
Alternatively, stakeholding could be thought of as a subset of basic income conceived more broadly.6 
Most commentators, though, assume that the periodic basic income streams would add up to far less than 
the generous stakeholding sum. Regardless of the total amounts in question, basic income diverges from 
stakeholding with respect to the sum that may be capitalized at any point in time. The loudest critics of 
stakeholding fear “stakeblowing,” wasteful abandonment of one’s endowment for frivolous or 
nonproductive uses. Some commentators have called for restrictions on the use of large capital grants to 
prevent stakeblowing in its many forms.7 Concerns over irresponsible spending reach their peak when 
abandoning the grant undermines the stakeholding plain’s repayment mandate. Without some control over 
acceptable use, a stakeholder simply could give away her grant to any recipient (other than an heir) and 
elude her responsibility to future generations. Ackerman and Alstott understand basic income as a form of 
liberal economic trusteeship but with the restrictions that normally attend spendthrift trusts.8 If a citizen’s 
access to the full stream of financial benefits depends on how long she survives, basic income in practice 
may satisfy only short-term consumer needs rather than broader life agendas. 
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B. Comparison with the Permanent Fund Dividend 
 
 Framing the PFD as more consistent with the basic income or stakeholding paradigm for asset-
based welfare in part requires one to fit the square-peg Alaska Model within round-hole categories. 
Although the PFD’s legislative origins sound in the universalism advocated by both schools of thought, it 
would be spurious to conclude that its sponsors considered either model. Nevertheless, Ackerman and 
Alstott specifically mentioned the PFD as a form of stakeholding at the state level, citing its broad 
political and popular support.9 Others have singled out the PFD for its exemplary use of the commons to 
enhance social welfare.10 Consider also that the Stakeholder Society and the PFD place a premium on 
distributing cash, the most liquid of assets, to qualified citizens. Both programs, however, emphasize how 
cash payments are tied to other assets held by the political community. In the Stakeholder Society, the 
$80,000 payment reflects an underlying right to “a fair share of the patrimony left by preceding 
generations”;11 in the PFD, Alaskans understand more directly that their dividends would not exist but for 
the natural bounty of the North Slope. Such connections between the Alaska Model and the content of 
asset-based welfare theory are real but not particularly helpful for exporting the PFD’s principles. 
Focusing instead on the equally real and salient differences between the PFD and the basic 
income/stakeholding paradigms highlights the ways in which the theory might be amended to align with 
practice or practice redesigned to approach the optimal theory. 
 First, the liberal political argument animating the stakeholding movement clashes in principle 
with the PFD’s structure. Equality of opportunity at the cusp of adulthood motivates the Stakeholder 
Society. Equal access to the monetary fruits of a nonrenewable natural resource prompted Alaska’s 
constitutional amendment and ensuing legislation. But equal payments to citizens within the respective 
schemes—even if they were not separated by orders of magnitude—do not reflect the same inherent 
commitments. Stakeholding asks more from the participants in and the outcomes from the asset program. 
Recipients would be expected to use their large sums to realize their own life plans, although no formal 
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strings would be attached. Stakeholding also attempts to erase large gaps in wealth that persist at birth 
solely because of chance. The PFD, on the other hand, has no documented purpose other than to distribute 
wealth the State currently generates from oil. It does not consider at all how residents will use their 
dividends and whether the State should exercise any paternalistic control over that use.         
 Second, the basic income model also incorporates a set of political commitments that extend 
beyond the PFD’s scope. In a recent article,12 Van Parijs conjectured that basic income require only some 
“modest” cash transfer, not a sum that could meet a citizen’s basic housing, food, and other subsistence 
means. On this account, one could summarily label the PFD a “basic income” program. The PFD endows 
Alaskans with annual income at much more modest levels than the idealized stakeholder program. No 
state resident could survive on the average $1400 disbursed since the dividend’s inception. Yet Van Parijs 
conceptualizes basic income initiatives as powerful antidotes to the problems of poverty and 
unemployment. It activates “not only the freedom to purchase or consume” but also “the freedom to live 
as one might like to live.”13 Just as with stakeholding, basic income concepts impose obligations on the 
state to maximize economic, and eventually political, liberty for dividend recipients.   
 However, the PFD takes one important policy cue from the basic income camp. Ackerman and 
Alstott view their capital stock proposal as superior to the flow structure supported by Van Parijs and 
others. In their words: “Even if payments began on the eagerly awaited twenty-first birthday, the stream 
of small checks would not create a proud culture of free citizenship.”14 They argue further that basic 
income betrays a commitment to universality. Providing payments so long as the individual could use the 
resources neglects her status as one who should receive some share of society’s wealth. Stakeholder sums 
recast a familiar maxim as: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his citizenship.” 
Making the most of PFD payments for one’s individual agenda also depends on having the fortune to live 
long enough to realize that agenda. Stakeholding attempts to reduce the importance of longevity through a 
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sizeable, upfront capital endowment. As a matter of politics and practicality, Alaskans certainly cannot 
obtain an advance on their dividends nor borrow against their expected receipts. Thus, the letter of the 
PFD’s enacting law echoes the mechanics of a basic income program but not its spirit. 
Similarly, the original Ackerman and Alstott proposal suggested that “a citizen should be required 
to live for at least eleven of his twenty-one years in [the United States] before qualifying for his eighty 
thousand dollars.”15 Alaska statute likewise mandates that PFD recipients reside in the state during the 
entire qualifying year and be physically present in the state for at least three consecutive days during the 
prior two years before the year of potential payment.16 It also carries the prohibition on criminal activity 
included in stakeholding proposals.17 As with the apparent connection to basic income designs, the PFD’s 
relationship with stakeholding as a universal asset model is superficial at best.  
 Looking across the Atlantic to another well-known universal asset program, the United 
Kingdom’s Child Trust Fund (CTF) more closely reflects the PFD in scope. Beginning with the cohort 
born in 2002, each British child received in trust an initial endowment of £250 or £500 (depending on his 
family’s economic circumstances), which accrues interest and to which friends and family may supply 
additional funds each year. One estimate implies that, if a child’s family contributed the average £24 per 
month into his savings account, he would receive almost £10,000 at age eighteen.18 Thus, many children 
eligible for CTF contributions would receive almost as much as their Alaskan counterparts through an 
admittedly more complex and bureaucratically administered program. Comparing the CTF and the PFD is 
instructive because the sums received at maturity are much more than any one likely stream of basic 
income but less than the grand blueprint for a Stakeholder Society. Even the U.K.’s stated objectives 
confirm that the CTF combines important elements of both basic income and stakeholding but does not 
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presume any prioritization.19 As we know, however, precisely those families struggling to maintain 
income levels above the poverty line are least likely to have the capacity or desire to set aside the funds 
necessary for a modest account balance at maturity. More affluent parents would be most expected to treat 
the CTF as a tax shelter of sorts, transferring small amounts of money each year to their children while 
avoiding levies on inheritances. Consequently, the CTF is even more likely to approach the PFD in size 
and purpose: a modest government grant that can be used to meet short-term consumption needs.      
 In short, the semblance between the PFD and the two universal asset paradigms appears only skin 
deep. Advocates of both theories have tried to include the Alaska Model under their respective umbrellas. 
Aside from some common policy attributes, the PFD does not—or at least did not in the 1970s—fulfill 
the loftier ambitions of either a basic income or stakeholding initiative. Nevertheless, with strong political 
will, the PFD could be restructured to eclipse the restrictions of a basic income grant and approximate the 
stakeholding standard for children born and raised in Alaska.    
III. The PFD’s “Endogeneity Condition”  
 
 If neither basic income nor stakeholding, taken as presented by its foremost thinkers, finds 
sufficient purchase in the structure of and motivation for the PFD, can we nevertheless approximate either 
paradigm? In this Section, I argue that the auspicious funding source for the PFD—revenue from the sale 
of natural resources—permits not only a reformed PFD consistent with the theories discussed above but 
also a template for other governments trying to start basic income or stakeholding experiments in their 
jurisdictions. The relevant feature is what I term the “endogeneity condition,” namely that the Alaska 
Model is sui generis. The PFD would not exist without the discovery of North Slope oil. The program 
does not rely on taxation, borrowing, or other fiscal measures, only the fortune of the State’s natural 
resources. Labeling the Alaska Model as sui generis, however, does not preclude its application 
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elsewhere. To the contrary, any government that can delink its proposed endowment structure from the 
public treasury is best situated to embrace the PFD’s pioneering design. In this Section, I focus on how 
the endogeneity condition can facilitate the emergence of a Stakeholder Society at the local or national 
level.20  
Perhaps the most common rejoinder to universal asset programs highlights the size of the bill and 
who pays it. In a global economy nearly beset by financial collapse, critics might question how 
governments can afford to divert scarce fiscal resources into “charity” or “welfare” programs. Surely, 
ushering in the Stakeholder Society through a 2% wealth tax would barely have a chance of reaching the 
Senate floor ten years after it was outlined. Even a more modest basic income would run up against 
pressures to reduce deficits and would face strong opposition to its broad, means- and work-independent 
conditions. Moreover, the complex maneuvering that would be necessary to maintain “the highest average 
basic income” and tailoring income levels to a jurisdiction’s demographic composition might be too 
complex for a program like the PFD.21    
Focusing on the pure stakeholding vision of funding, consider Ackerman and Alstott’s dialogue 
with Van Parijs over fiscal policy. For Ackerman and Alstott, using wealth as the exclusive tax base for 
stakeholder grants reinforces the original premise for giving each adult such a handsome sum. Their 
assumption is that “the extreme concentration of wealth reflects past injustice and perpetuates it.”22 Of 
course, many in the top percentiles of the wealth/income distribution have profited from intrafamilial gifts 
and bequests. Others have achieved record levels of purchasing power through innovation and business 
savvy. More convincingly, Ackerman and Alstott maintain that taxing income (or income in addition to 
wealth) could undo the salutary effects of either a basic income or stakeholding program. Not only does a 
wealth tax highlight the most important source of disparities in living conditions and possibilities, 
sophisticated manipulation of the existing tax code shelters more and more income derived from capital. 
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Thus, a “hike in the income tax may amount . . . to yet another burden on wages, which are already 
heavily taxed for various social-insurance programs.”23     
The PFD’s endogenous, or systemically internal, financing mechanism avoids the thorny policy 
choice among tax bases as well as deciding whether to raise taxes at all. Stakeholding theory’s bold 
response to libertarians and utilitarians works on many conceptual levels, balancing simplicity and 
practicality in remarkable ways. But for the government seeking to “import” the Alaska Model, the best 
chances of garnering the large, population- and GDP-adjusted sums that Ackerman and Alstott would 
deem satisfactory to equalize economic starting points will emerge in societies where existing financial 
surpluses or revenues from existing tangible resources can be converted into cash payments. Hence, if 
providing the optimal startup grant for young citizens is what we ultimately care about in stakeholding, 
the endogeneity condition that has been integral to the PFD’s success could replace the initial wealth tax 
that Ackerman and Alstott proposed. The new universal asset program would not embody the political 
commitment to dismantling the arbitrary and perpetual hoarding of wealth. It would, though, yield a 
higher probability of long-term sustainability and popular backing.     
IV. Transforming the Permanent Dividend Fund into a True Stakeholding Program 
 
If the Alaska legislature were to embrace stakeholding principles more explicitly, it would have 
to make one of several fundamental changes to the design and payment structure of the PFD. To borrow 
Robert Goodin’s terminology, a politically and economically feasible transition would entail “sneaking up 
on stakeholding.”24 One of the necessary amendments would change the current periodic payment 
schedule into a capitalized, one-time grant. The other would involve the types of responsible stakeholding 
instruction that Ackerman and Alstott predict for a society committed to their theory.   
The easiest way conceptually—but maybe not politically—to reengineer the Alaska Model into a 
full stakeholding system would involve adult residents surrendering their distributions. Granted, the 
approximately $1000 - $2000 per adult resident per year would not be enough to subsidize a lump sum at 
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the magnitude envisioned by Ackerman and Alstott.25 But the best chance for Alaska or another adopting 
jurisdiction to institute the Stakeholder Society should be constrained by the endogeneity condition. In 
other words, if the only means for generating the necessary revenue were new tax provisions 
(consumption- or income-based) or other interferences with normal economic activity, the long-run 
stability of the new program might be jeopardized. Presumably if current PFD beneficiaries expressed a 
strong enough commitment to younger generations for a stakeholding program, the adult population 
reaching deciding that political question would forego their modest annual dividend to ensure its 
solvency.  
Ackerman and Alstott conceivably would deny that this version of the PFD upholds core values 
set out in their original proposal, namely the financially expedient and politically symbolic wealth tax 
approach to financing. As mentioned above, though, the endogeneity condition that already supports the 
Alaska Model remains its strongest virtue. Stakeholding was developed at the end of a decade marked by 
unmatched prosperity in the United States and high optimism for future growth. Local and national 
economic conditions at present are so dire that exporting the PFD as a model for stakeholding will require 
not only political but also philosophical compromise. The Stakeholder Society takes equal wealth 
holdings at adulthood as its first principle. Thus, we should be able to treat the symbolism that wealth tax 
funding provides as a second-order concern to actually achieving the universal asset policy stakeholding 
promises.  
Finally, the Permanent Fund Dividend Division, which manages the PFD, would need to 
supplement its administrative duties with a formal educational program for schoolchildren years before 
they are scheduled to receive their stakes. Will Paxton and Stuart White have defined “complementary 
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education” as a method for increasing the chances that capital grants will be used responsibly.26 Such 
instruction might emerge as organized “discussion sessions in which people talk about what one can do 
with [a grant]: Representatives of universities, vocational trading schools, small business associations and 
trade unionists could all contribute to these sessions.”27 Ackerman and Alstott certainly hold high 
aspirations for weaving stakeholding ideas into the American education system.28 The bottom line is that 
transforming the smaller PFD outlays into a major one-time capital grant, especially since no child or 
family will have sacrificed personally because of the endogeneity condition, requires additional training in 
financial responsibility. These sessions or classes must remain neutral with respect to the choices that 
young men and women make for themselves with their newly acquired stakes. But the local or national 
government replicating the Alaska Model has its own stake in sharing information about sound human 
and capital investment strategies. 
V. Conclusion 
 
 The differences between Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend and the Stakeholder Society 
proposal appear, at first glance, to exemplify the differences between basic income and stakeholding 
theory. The basic income approach to economic citizenship emphasizes how regular dividend streams can 
help alleviate unending cycles of poverty among the lowest portions of the income distribution. 
Stakeholding focuses on economic independence at the point when individuals can assume responsibility 
for their roles as citizens in a common political community. The superficial connections between the PFD 
and basic income, most noticeable through the Alaska Model’s current payment levels, become less 
salient once we realize that the PFD stands apart in many ways from both stakeholding and basic income. 
At present, no liberal political goal underlies the annual payments that the State’s residents receive. Yet it 
offers policymakers attracted to universal asset policies the invaluable flexibility of funding from outside 
regular fiscal policy—what I have termed the endogeneity condition—that neither basic income nor 
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stakeholding currently portends. Should any government realize Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott’s 
proposal for a large capital grant at the age of maturity, it will most likely depend on “exporting” not just 
a natural-resource-based funding source but any source that does not require modifications to tax policy 
or other redistributive mechanisms. Of course, under this chapter’s proposal, the newly conceived PFD 
would not accrue to adults. Stakeholding is meant to benefit the young, and embracing a modified PFD 
along with dedicated financial education just might transform what many consider a pie-in-the-sky theory 
into practical reality. 
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